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Abstract
Somalia has been one of the UN member countries who lingers from the presence of 
terrorist groups in its territory, that exert tremendous influence in the daily life of its 
society and economy. Al Shabaab is well known in the horn of Africa, particularly in 
Somalia, for its terrorist training and strong affiliation with other terrorist groups in 
Nigeria and Al-Qaeda. The Harakat Shabaab Al Mujahidin, also known as Al-Shabaab. 
has completely controlled the central and southern part of Somalia including some of 
its important sea ports, which are vital for the country’s economy. Although Ethiopian 
and Somali military forces attempted to rout the group in a two week war between 
December 2006 and January 2007, Al Shabaab, with its 14,500 militants, still continues 
to maintain control over strategic locations, not only in Somalia, but also throughout 
the horn of Africa.1 
The paper delves into the recent events and attacks either undertaken or influenced 
by Al-Shabaab, including a snap shot of its threat to humanitarian aid personnel as 
well as the Africa Union troops who are desperately trying to lower the intensity 
of conflict along the Somalia Kenya border area and Al-Shabaab’s actions to secure 
financial resources.
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Introduction
One of the major terrorist groups known to embrace a threatening violence in the 
horn of Africa is the Harakat Shabaab Al Mujahidin, also known as Al-Shabaab. 
Based in Somalia, it has completely controlled the central and southern part of that 
country since the second half of 2006. Both Ethiopian and Somali government forces 
attempted to rout the group in a two week war between December 2006 and January 
2007, but Al Shabaab, with its over 14,500 militants, still continues to maintain control 
1 http://www.nctc.gov/site/groups/al_shabaab.html (Accessed on 10/23/2011)
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over strategic locations, not only in Somalia, but also throughout the horn of Africa.2 
The objective of this paper is to look deeper into and the attacks either undertaken 
or influenced by Al-Shabaab, including a snap shot of its threat to humanitarian aid 
personnel as well as the efforts of the Africa Union troops who are desperately trying 
to lower the intensity of conflict along the Somalia Kenya border area and reduce Al-
Shabaab’s actions to secure constant financial resources. 
During 2006-2009, the intervention of Ethiopian forces caused the Islamic Courts Union 
(ICU), to splinter into several smaller organizations.3 This also marked the flourishing 
of a number of small extremist organizations; Al Shabaab being one of them, which 
described itself as an organization waging Jihad against enemies of Islam.4 Hence, Al-
Shabaab repeatedly engaged in fights against the Africa Union Mission to Somalia 
(AMISOM) and Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government (TFG) forces. Due to this 
organization’s aggressive attitude and actions against foreign assistance organizations, 
including not only intimidating, but also kidnapping and killing aid and relief workers, 
the workers and crisis management experts who are dedicating so much of their 
energy towards the betterment of the critical situation in Somalia have been forced to 
exit the country without a possibility of return in sight. 
Al Shabaab, its operations and organization structure
Al-Shabaab was founded in 2004 and though long considered a terrorist organization 
by many countries, including Australia, Canada, Norway, Sweden and the UK, was 
finally formally designated as a terrorist organization by the U.S. Government on 
February 29th, 2008. Al Shabaab is characterized as a very decentralized organization 
regarding the establishment of its agenda and goals. Its ranking members are from a 
number of disparate clans and the organization is susceptible to clan politics, internal 
divisions and shifting alliances. The majority of its fighters are interested mostly in the 
nationalistic battle against the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in Mogadishu 
and currently are not supportive of global Jihad, although high ranking leadership is 
believed to have trained in Afghanistan and orchestrated the bombings in Kampala, 
Uganda, on July 11th, 2010. However, taking into consideration its methods and its 
day to day operations, Al Shabaab can be compared to the Taliban in Afghanistan and 
Pakistan. They also have an opponent group which is the moderate Sufi indigenous 
group Ahlu Sunna Waljama’a, located in the southern border areas with Kenya. In 
August 2005, the TFG troops and their Africa Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) allies 
managed to wrest control all of Mogadishu from the Al Shabaab militants. This might 
2 http://www.nctc.gov/site/groups/al_shabaab.html (Accessed on 10/23/2011)
3 An Islamic group of Sharia Courts who has established a stronghold, until 2006, in the Southern regions of Somalia and its 
predominant population, therefore being a rival organization of the Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG). In addition 
to the Capital city of Mogadishu, they controlled cities such as: Jowhar,Kismayo, Beledweyne.
4 http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/2/8/27468/World/Region/Ethiopian-intervention-in-Somalia-risks-worsening-.aspx
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have been considered as a major success but it also helped Al Shabaab at the same time 
to expand its ranks and keep up the pressure of violence and attempted control of the 
remaining regions of Somalia, enabled by the limited success and efforts undertaken 
by the TFG and AMISOM Troops. 
At first, Al-Shabaab was run by Aden Hashi Farah “Ayro”, appointed by Hassan Dahir 
Aweys, one of the leaders of Islamic Court Union (ICU) at the time of the organization’s 
founding. After Ayro’s death, Sheikh Mukhtar Robow (known as Abu Mansur) 
became a leader until he was succeeded by Moktar Ali Zubeyr “Godane.” The later 
had the authority to control the food reserves during the drought of 2010-2011. Due 
to a severe drought and the assassination of its top officials, the organization has 
experienced a few changes in its ranks and its current leader is Ibrahim Haji Jama 
Mee’aad, also known as Ibrahim “al – Afghani.” All Al Shabaab leaders have praised 
Usama bin Laden and confirmed their allegiances with Al-Qaeda global operations. 
Al-Shabaab has claimed responsibility for many bombing attacks, including various 
suicide attacks in Mogadishu and in Central and northern Somalia particularly targeting 
members of the TFG force and its perceived allies. The group was blamed for five 
coordinated suicide car bombings in October 2008 that simultaneously hit targets in 
two cities in Northern Somalia, killing almost 26 people, including five bombers, and 
injuring 29 others. This organization has been also accused by Ugandan officials of 
conducting the simultaneous attacks in Kampala, Uganda, on July 11th, 2010 which 
killed more than seventy people. Al Shabaab leaders continuously call upon their 
rebels to fight against the Africa Union troops based in Mogadishu and throughout 
Somalia. This terrorist group continues to exert a strong control over strategic locations 
of Somalia by applying guerrilla asymmetric warfare. 
Within the southern and central provincial regions of Somalia controlled by Al-
Shabaab are: Bay and Bokool regions, led by Mukhtar Roobow (Abu Mansur), the 
group’s spokesman; south - central Somalia and Mogadishu; Puntland, Somaliland; 
and the Juba Valley, led by Hassan Abdillahi Hersi (Turki), who is not considered to 
be a member of Al-Shabaab, but is closely aligned with it. Somalia is ripe to become 
another terrorist safe heaven and it is believed that it will require an international 
intervention such as in Afghanistan or Libya to keep this from happening. Al-Shabaab 
has claimed affiliation with Al-Qaeda since 2007; and its attempts to have stronger ties 
with Al Qaeda, to promote their ideology and attract jihadists from around the world 
have raised the level of international concern (including the U. S.) that its influence 
will spread to affiliates in Kenya, Yemen and beyond. According to a report by a Senior 
American military commander for Africa, three violent extremist organizations - 
Al-Shabaab, Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb across the Sahel Region of northern 
Africa and Boko Haram in Northern Nigeria – have attempted to forge an alliance 
and coordinate attacks against the United States and western targets. The pentagon 
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confirmed that the three groups had been targeting local government offices, and 
although they had different ideologies, they still had an alliance of convenience. 
In addition to getting a steady flow of dollars from the Somali Diaspora, Al-Shabaab is 
also impressive in terms of convincing Somalis abroad to return to fight in their ranks 
of jihad. Two infamous cases are known as the “Minneapolis 8” and the “Toronto 6” 
two code-named indoctrination projects that were successful in turning into fighters a 
number of Somali-American young adults. Shirwa Ahmed, a Somali-born citizen, who 
blew himself up in northern Somalia in 2008, was the first known American Suicide 
Bomber. Minneapolis 8 was also involved in planning attacks against Austrian Police 
and attempted an attack during President Obama’s inauguration ceremony.
United Nations role in reducing violence
According to a report issued in July, 2011 by the United Nations monitoring group on 
Somalia and Eritrea, the Al-Shabaab generates USD 70-100 million annually through 
by not only taxing but also extorting Somalia’s entrepreneurs and shop keepers in 
airports, seaports and various marketplaces, by calling it a “religious obligation.” It 
now completely controls Somalia’s number one airport and also the world- famous 
Bakara market. It is widely believed that Al -Shabaab collects revenue also from Somali 
Diaspora in the United States and Europe and through various Islamic Charities. 
Even though the United Nations seems to lack the power and muscle in targeting 
Al-Shabaab finances, the U.N. monitoring group on Somalia and Eritrea in late July 
2011, took a number of decisive actions against the group by blacklisting Al-Shabaab 
members through a “name and shame” campaign. It was thought that making them 
part of a list maintained by the U.N. would highly affect the group’s ability to obtain, 
finances and other facets of support from their domestic and international partners. 
The U.N. Monitoring group has also requested that the United Arab Emirates take 
measures to more closely control their commercial shipments and dealings in the 
seaports controlled by Al-Shabaab, as they are the major customer for importing 
charcoal from Somalia; an industry that generates USD 400-800 million annually for 
the terrorist organization. 
The monitoring group has brought this matter to the attention of the administrations 
of Dubai and Sharjah, and asked them to take “more stringent measures on dhows 
[sailing vessels] conducting trade” with sea ports controlled by Al-Shabaab. 
By mid-2011, the U N officials declared that Somalia had met the technical criteria of 
famine as it is defined by of death and malnutrition rates. Unfortunately the famine 
continues to spread, covering a large portion of southern Somalia including areas of 
Mogadishu and a few farming provinces. Recent figures reveal that about 12 million 
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people in Kenya, Somalia, and Djibouti are in need of USD 1.4 billion in aid. This is the 
most devastating famine in the last sixty years. 
It is very discouraging to help a country such as Somalia which has been a failing 
state for a long time; but the international community has to address seriously a 
combination of two challenges and growing obstacles in the horn of Africa: the Al-
Shabaab influence to the locals and in the same provinces and cities a famine stricken 
population that is forcibly being held in these areas with very limited food resources. 
Some members of organizational-Shabaab want to allow western elements to assist 
in the food supply process in the southern famine areas of Southern Bakool and 
Lower Shabelle, whereas some hard-line activists don’t wish to grant access. Some 
organizations such as the International Committee of the Red Crescent are expanding 
a therapeutic feeding program for children suffering from severe malnutrition isolated 
in rural areas of southern Somalia, but Al-Shabaab may insist on forcing them to scuttle 
those projects. 
According to U.N estimates there were about 3.7 million people in crisis in Somalia 
with 3.2 million in need of immediate help, at the beginning of 2012. Terrorism training 
camps, extreme malnutrition among Somalia’s citizens and children, Somalia’s weak 
Transitional Federal Government, all coupled with the persisting global financial crisis, 
depict a grim future not only for the improvement of people’s lives in Somalia but 
also the more difficult situation of reducing the extremist and violent actions of a 
belligerent organization such as Al-Shabaab which is spreading its influence rapidly in 
the border areas between Southern Somalia and Kenya including also the tri-border 
areas between Ethiopia, Somalia and Kenya. 
The Financial Action Task Force (FATF), an intergovernmental body that establishes a 
set of restrictions and principles regarding terrorism finance and money laundering 
has also taken action in its August, 2011 Paris plenary meeting by issuing a statement 
addressed to financial institutions and charities around the world. The FATF calls upon 
them to enhance control and monitor carefully their dealings with Somalia. These 
actions would bring together a number of organizations, policy makers, law enforcement 
agencies and banking authorities to tackle in a concerted way the question of how to 
lower the influence of Al-Shabaab in Somalia and in the entire Horn of Africa. This kind 
of “economic firepower”, in addition to an African Union intervention, is likely to be 
the most effective strategy towards reducing the influence and financial operations of 
Al-Shabaab in the area. The banks must take on the decisive role of stemming the flow 
of capital to the organization.
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US Actions against Al-Shabaab and State Refugee Camps in Somalia
During the course of last year, the U. S. government has increased its operations against 
terrorism in Somalia. It has intensified the drone aircraft attacks against Al-Shabaab 
militias and approved USD 45 million in light weapons’ shipments to the African Union, 
mainly Ethiopian soldiers fighting in Somalia. Since the Operation Gothic Serpent or the 
“black hawk down” incident in Somalia on October 3-4th, 1993 which caused the death 
of eighteen U.S. forces, the U.S. has been reluctant to become involved in Somalia. 
And probably with good reason. Although Al-Shabaab has not undertaken significant 
offensive actions outside of Africa, it has inflicted great damage in the region, including 
the killing of a dozen Ugandans in 2010, immediately after Uganda’s government 
decision to send troops to Somalia. Because the U.S. administration suspects and 
fears that Al-Shabaab will undertake actions against the west, it has outsourced its 
presence in the Horn of Africa only to African soldiers and private companies during 
the last two decades. As it often happens, the State Department has encountered 
disagreements with military officials over the effectiveness of raids and offensive 
campaigns against the sites suspected of being militant camps and whether these 
actions would considerably affect Al-Shabaab or bolster its ranks by acknowledging it 
as an established group against a foreign power. 
Currently, the African Union has about 9000 soldiers headquartered in Mogadishu to 
support Somalia’s fragmented and weak army and the country’s Transitional Federal 
Government. According to a number of U. S. officials Al-Shabaab’s main aim is to 
fight against the Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG). This is more evident 
once we take into account the nomination of a new Prime Minister Abdiweli M. Ali 
who was educated in the United States and taught at some of the nation’s prominent 
universities. This nomination is a great step forward if compared to the dictatorship 
and cult of personality of Gen. Siad Barre, which lasted two decades. After ousting 
Gen. Barre regime, Somalia experienced almost two decades of lack of government 
structure that enabled Al-Shabaab to expand its ranks and guerrilla fighters. 
Another “hot” region is along the border between Somalia and Kenya. The conflict 
erupted as Al-Shabaab wanted to take back a slice of territory that was under the 
control of a militia group allied to the Somali government. In the same vein, Al-Shabaab 
has embarked on massive campaigns to destroy and break up camps established for 
the victims of famine in Somalia. The recent border conflict is not doing anything else 
except sending the population back to the drought- stricken areas, even though Al- 
Shabaab has showed commitment to supply enough food to feed the people until the 
next harvest season. According to U.N. officials this is considered as a “nightmare” 
and according to U.N. workers, “It has been hard enough to access famine victims 
in Shabaab areas, and now that the people have been scattered, that means more 
checkpoints, more local authorities to deal with, and more negotiations.” During the 
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end of last year it was witnessed that hundreds of Al-Shabaab fighters headed towards 
the Southern border between Somalia and Kenya; and within a few days they mounted 
an offensive against Dhobley, a city known for its regional commodities market. 
and being under the rule of an Islamic warlord who is French educated The fight in 
Dhobley was witnessed by the program director of American refugee Committee, 
who emphasized that “It was a big fight” and he continued that “it’s likely to impact 
humanitarian operations because there are many feeding centers in Dhobley”. 
Dhobley is just a few miles away from the border with Kenya, and Kenya’s military 
forces have pledged to undertake a military operation if a second attack persists in the 
coming months. The Kenyan government is also worried that Al-Shabaab may conduct 
violent attacks inside Kenya itself. During the border conflict between Al- Shabaab and 
the regional rebel group in support of the Transitional Government, the Kenyan forces 
were careful not to engage directly in Somalia’s internal fighting. Nonetheless Kenya 
is playing a major role in receiving a large number of refugees fleeing their country 
and moving to Kenya rather than face being killed directly by Al-Shabaab or indirectly 
because of drought and famine. It must be noted that Al-Shabaab has single handedly 
and abruptly closed several of the refugee camps and urged the locals to return to 
their fields and plant crops right before a rainy season would start.5
Under the constraints of having limited troops and human intelligence resources in the 
Horn of Africa and particularly in Somalia, the Obama administration is facing major 
challenges towards bolstering the efforts to stabilize the country by strengthening 
Somalia’s weak government which is dealing with a large number of hungry citizens 
and children. According to UN officials, famine is spreading quickly in Somalia and will 
continue to do so unless international organizations step up their efforts in feeding 
the population. Western aid agencies have been facing insurmountable difficulties in 
areas controlled by Al-Shabaab, and in some areas its fighters have established their 
own camps to feed the people, sometimes even forcing the population to choose their 
camps instead of those established by the west or the African Union and perhaps to 
stay there and starve. 
5 Many international organizations have joined the efforts to increase the aid towards Somalia and its people. Al Qaeda is also 
added to the long list of the enormous aid industry in the country. According to the Guardian Many Somalis are suspicious 
to western aid agencies, due to fear of them to have a "side with particular political groups or clans, and bankroll warlords". 
Although Al-Qaeda has recently come in to Somalia and lend a hand to help the hungry and thirsty people of Somalia. 
Al-Shabaab, on territories where it has established control; applies a preferential practice towards the international aid 
organizations, it is obvious that they are willing to allow Muslim Charities, particularly those coming from the Gulf countries 
and Turkey. According to Dr. Unni Karunakara, international president of Médecins Sans Frontières: “the challenges are often 
exacerbated when famine is combined with conflict.” As a result it is unrealistic to imagine that sending over food or money 
to procure food is going to resolve the problem. Combating famine is hard, when trying to eradicate or reduce famine in a war 
torn region, this makes it even more difficult and complex. The situation in Al-Shabaab controlled areas is no different from a 
difficult and pessimistic region, in which its impossible to conduct the tasks of reducing malnutrition. Interestingly enough, the 
only places where the United Nations has officially declared famine are regions controlled by Al-Shabaab in Somalia. 
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Somalia’s last functioning government fell in 1991 and since then it has been a safe 
haven for terrorists and Al-Qaeda operatives. The only hope is the current presence 
of U. S. Special Forces Green Berets in Uganda and Central Africa - who have been 
stationed in the region since October, 2011. They were sent under the executive order 
of President Barack Obama to help local forces battle against the Lord’s Resistance 
Army, comprised of 200 rebels orchestrating a campaign of murder and rape, that 
begun almost at the same time that Al-Shabaab came into existence, about 20 years 
ago. The U.S. Special Forces will assist the Democratic Republic of Congo, Central African 
Republic and Southern Sudan perhaps keeps an eye on the deteriorating situation 
in Somalia. But just monitoring can’t eradicate the violence and the flourishing of 
terrorist elements and extremism in the region. 
Conclusion
Al-Shabaab is a clear present and growing danger not only in the horn of Africa but 
well beyond the region. It will be training terrorists in a growing scale in the coming 
years. Peace Accords have reduced the violence and brought political violence to its 
lowest levels in years in Somalia, but simultaneously we see that violence and dramatic 
decrease of public order and safety has been the cornerstone challenges in all of the 
horn of Africa. The fall of the Soviet Union and its withdrawal from Afghanistan was 
the first in a series of events that allowed terrorist organizations to gain a foothold, but 
lack of appropriate intervention has allowed them to grow exponentially. According to 
Professor Harmon “terrorism is here to stay.” We cannot forget the attack of Pakistani 
gunmen who shot dead two people and maimed three more, nearby the Langley 
Virginia base, and the attacks against U.S. citizens that are sure to occur in the coming 
years.6
There must be a concerted effort in order to counter terrorist actions and its aspirations 
in all sectors, including defensive military actions, humanitarian aid, public diplomacy 
and the use of other means of soft power. We are entering the second decade of the 
twenty first century with what seems perhaps like apparent victory against terrorist 
organizations, considering that there has not been a single attack on U.S. soil during 
the last ten years. Hope remains high that we keep the same level of vigilance not 
only in a domestic front but also in countries where our presence is highly needed, 
including the Horn of Africa, a strategic region with persisting problems and long lived 
challenges awaiting to be confronted and dealt with in near and distant the future. 
It behooves us to take care of our friends in Africa, for if we do not, the cancer of 
terrorism may find us yet again. 
6 Harmon, Christopher. Terrorism Today. London, Frank Cass Publishers, 2000 (pp137-138).
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